On Tuesday night, Iran attacked Israel – UK forces were, minimally, involved in defending Israel. On Wednesday, Keir Starmer headed to Brussels to talk about a reset of EU-UK relations. War in the Middle East, and the continued destruction of Gaza, raise much bigger critical and immediate challenges than a slow amelioration of UK relations with the European Union. But both Starmer’s foreign policy as well as his approach to the EU so far betoken more continuity than change.
We learned little new from Starmer’s meeting with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. There will now be annual EU-UK summits. And there will be talks on several more detailed issues in the coming months – currently specified in broad not specific terms.
As the Labour government’s first 100 days approaches, Keir Starmer has clearly decided being bold on the EU at the start of his term of government is not the way to go. He repeats periodically, as he did yesterday in Brussels, that there will be no return to free movement nor to the EU’s single market or customs union. This is like some charm to ward off the right-wing media which may work until specific issues and new EU-UK cooperation emerge.
Starmer remains keen that everyone should agree with him on his softly-softly, hard Brexit approach to the EU. At yesterday’s press conference after his meeting with Ursula von der Leyen, he said: “I firmly believe that the British public wants a return to pragmatic, sensible leadership when it comes to dealing with our closest neighbours, to make Brexit work and to deliver in their interest to find ways to boost economic growth, strengthen our security and tackle shared challenges like irregular migration and climate change.”
The main problem with this remains that ‘making Brexit work’ is a contradiction in terms if you want growth and a removal of EU-UK trade barriers. And a majority of the British public regret Brexit, see that it isn’t working and don’t endorse Boris Johnson’s hard Brexit, even while Starmer essentially does.
So, there may be detailed talks around issues Labour has mentioned frequently in the last year – including a potential veterinary deal to reduce barriers to agrifood trade, and mutual recognition of professional qualifications. But none of this will undo most of the damage done by Brexit.
The EU is keen on some form of youth mobility deal. If the UK’s new government proves too scared of the pro-Brexit media to agree that in some form, then EU-UK relations will indeed be more friendly under Starmer than under Boris Johnson but perhaps little more. Hopefully, some form of youth mobility agreement will emerge at some point but this is not definite for now.
By mid-2026, EU-UK energy cooperation is anyway due for review. And a new annual EU-UK deal on fisheries comes up at the same time. So, any new EU-UK cooperation on energy, climate and biodiversity may become inevitably linked to these looming deadlines (the EU knew what it was doing in terms of bargaining leverage when it pushed for the same dates for renewing energy cooperation as for the more neuralgic fishing deal).
What may be positive in all this is simply that Starmer is clearly aiming for a calmer, low profile approach to the UK’s relations with the EU than under the Tories – a normalisation, as far as anything about the UK’s continuing hard Brexit is normal. Some sort of EU-UK defence and security pact may emerge, closer cooperation on climate, more talks, more information-sharing.
Yet on current critical security issues, notably the Middle East, EU member states do not agree – as we’ve seen in divisions over Gaza in the last year. And Ursula von der Leyen continues to weaken her climate approach as she leans to the right – as seen this week with the announced one year delay to the EU’s new anti-deforestation regulation.
That doesn’t mean there isn’t scope for EU-UK cooperation across climate and security issues but the UK has lost its significant, pre-Brexit say on the EU’s positions from the inside, and cannot easily dynamise or control the EU’s internal dynamics from the outside. This much reduced influence is, at least, in terms of the UK’s positions on Gaza and continuing supply of weapons to Israel a good thing. Possibly less so on climate change.
Overall, it’s not so much steady as she goes, as slow as she goes. It’s not a UK strategy on the EU that would take the UK anywhere near a bold and positive move such as rejoining the EU customs union. That’s for another decade, another government, if at all.
And Scotland?
What is there for Scotland in all this? Not that much. Lower barriers to trade in agricultural and food products would be welcome – likewise a youth mobility deal, even under more constraints than there were with free movement. A more positive tone in EU-UK relations is welcome too.
As for the independence debate – lower EU-UK trade barriers mean lower Scotland-rest of UK trade barriers if and when Scotland is independent in the EU. But somewhat lower trade barriers will not, under Starmer’s light reset of Johnson’s hard Brexit, remove more than a little of the economic hit from the new England-Scotland border (an EU external border) in the independence scenario (any more than it will for the EU-Britain border at present).
Starmer is sticking to his minimalist, improve hard Brexit at the margins approach. And so, it remains the case, even while many in Scotland now think independence looks further off than it did after the Brexit vote, that the faster route to being back in the EU is independence rather than waiting for the UK to rejoin (which may never happen). And that is why neither the re-join the EU nor the independence debates are going away.
If Starmer fails -- which he probably will -- then many people will decide that both Tories and Labour have failed. In this situation, many in England will turn to Farage. And many in Scotland will turn to independence. And, given the way Westminster has treated Scotland since the last indyref, we a very likely to win.
you not yin