Scotland: Independence in Europe in the face of Trumpian World Disorder?

Scotland’s independence debate is largely invisible at the moment, despite a small lead for independence in most polls in the last six months. That invisibility is no great surprise as Trump and his entourage upend the global order and supplant US democracy with a ‘strong man’ authoritarianism. Global and local insecurity – whether economic or military – doesn’t provide the most obvious basis for a renewed push on the case for independence.

In the UK, cuts that hit the poorest most will certainly not help Scottish Labour in next year’s Holyrood elections. But the Scottish government appears rather absent, for now, on making the independence case (though, surely, they will have to find their voice on the issue before next May’s elections).

Independence challenges depend on the future of Europe

In this new and uncertain international context, the case for independence will rest, even more than before, on Scotland’s future role and base in European organisations, notably the European Union. And making that case will require a clear, regularly updated analysis of future prospects for the EU and, too, for NATO.

The constitutional choice for Scotland is either staying within the UK or being firmly part of the EU and European security bodies. The case for jumping to independence outside the EU was always a weak one; in a Trumpian world, it makes no sense at all.

Even in this transformed European and global context, many of the questions facing Scotland remain the same. How to negotiate a divorce from the UK, how to establish a Scottish central bank, a new currency, how to join the EU – all these questions and more do not disappear in the Trumpian world disorder.

But, as Trump sides with Russia, there are major new and/or intensified challenges that must be taken on board. Three substantial issues – security, transition and uncertainty – now set a new context for independence. Showing that Scotland can handle the dynamic transition that setting out as a new state will require has always been the most challenging part of the independence case. That is even more true in this new world disorder.

Security – hard and soft

On hard security, the SNP’s goal is for an independent Scotland to join NATO but no longer host any nuclear weapons in Scotland. But looking forward to an independent Scotland in, say, the next 5-10 years, we now don’t know if NATO will still exist or what might take its place.

Currently, we see many European nations move to increase their defence spending, while the EU itself issued a white paper on defence and re-armament just ten days ago, including proposing to raise €150 billion for loans to member states, and potentially other European countries, for defence investments. Outside EU structures, several informal European security summits, with a varying cast of states attending, have been held by both president Macron and prime minister Starmer, not least to coordinate on a possible peace-keeping or ‘reassurance’ force for Ukraine in the face of Trump’s unpredictable negotiations with Russia and Ukraine.

All this just two months into Trump’s presidency. We can only speculate about what the shape of European security might look like by the end of the decade and beyond. But some form of new European hard security structures look to be on the cards and evolving rapidly.

This uncertainty and disruption need not undermine the argument for an independent Scotland’s future security arrangements. Scotland is a European country. It will be able to participate in whatever evolving arrangements we see in the coming years. And, on hard security and defence, we are likely to see the continuation of both new EU defence programmes and EU collaboration, formal and informal, with non-EU countries, including notably the UK.

That flexibility may even help an independent Scotland during the early days of independence, if it means Scotland can easily step into some security groupings as a new state while taking whatever time is needed to join NATO or whatever European security grouping may have replaced it by then. That may include participating in EU defence structures where possible as a candidate country.

On the economic security and opportunities that the EU’s economic clout, single market and customs union would provide, the future looks murky too. On the day (28^th March) that Trump has announced 25% car tariffs, the question of where the US global trade war may take both the European and global economy next is unclear even just looking to the end of this year, never mind looking forward 5-10 years. The UK – even while Starmer and Reeves indicate they, unlike most other major states and the EU, will not retaliate on car tariffs – is not immune from the high economic costs of the Trump presidency.

Making the economic case for independence in an uncertain world where economic prospects are unstable is not easy. But there may never be a good, as in upbeat, time to make this case for choosing between the UK and EU. The new global reality calls for a new realism and a new look at the advantages of EU membership for an independent Scotland in a much tougher world than the one of 2014.

Transition

The inevitable transition years that Scotland will face, as it starts out and develops as an independent state, look more difficult in our newly turbulent and insecure world. A hard look is needed at the threats during transition to Scotland’s security in a world disorder where the US and Russia may be effectively allies. Is leaving the UK and moving over time into European structures going to leave Scotland more at risk in hard security terms for however long its transition takes?

Or can provisional security arrangements for an independent Scotland be negotiated after any vote for independence and before independence day? Scotland may not face the sort of challenges Denmark does today, with Trump’s demands to take over Greenland, nor that faced by the Baltic states bordering Russia. But it has an exposed Atlantic coastline, and it will need allies and frameworks on day one of independence if a plausible case for a secure transition is to be made.

On the economic side, if it’s in the next decade, then Scotland’s path to joining the EU will still look fairly robust within EU enlargement and accession processes. But much more clarity is needed, especially in an uncertain economic environment, of how an independent Scotland will access EU and UK markets during transition.

The usual accession route for candidate countries is to agree an association agreement with the EU, easing a candidate’s way into key EU policies, and towards the single market. In a world of beggar-my-neighbour tariff wars, Scotland will need to be clear which trade bloc it is part of. It won’t be able to afford to stand alone economically as it leaves the UK. A much clearer and fuller case of how a trade and association agreement with the EU would work will be needed.

Uncertainty

Making a case for independence in the face of the rapid evolution of such a disruptive, turbulent new geopolitical era will be tough. Big questions are shrouded in uncertainty: will the US recover in the next decade back towards being a democratic state, will devastating climate change impacts increase as climate policies fall down political priority lists, will the EU hold together?

And where in the coming years will politics go in different European states – might we see a le Pen presidency in France, a future AfD victory in Germany or a Reform government in the UK?

Scotland is not an outside observer of how these politics unfold. It is a part of Europe and part of demonstrating the case for effective democratic politics, defending human rights, acting on climate change. Being part of European networks, organisations and debates is more not less important in these new times.

The EU, after these first turbulent two months of Trump’s presidency, has responded relatively quickly to the challenges Trump has posed. It has its own reactionary member states, notably Hungary and Slovakia, and will have to find effective ways to stop such states being blockers when urgent decisions are needed – not only but not least on Ukraine. The EU may manage these tough years in a strategic, powerful way or it may weaken and find itself in more trouble. If it fails, then all bets are off.

The case for an independent Scotland in the EU will have to face up to this evolving and uncertain European and global landscape. It will need to be a deeper case and one that requires contributing to European and global debates not watching from outside.

EU enlargement

There are other aspects of European politics to be alert to as well in this new age of insecurity, not least around how enlargement to new member states may unfold.

The European politics around independence has changed, compared to the early post-Brexit years, when sympathy for Scotland’s pro-European vote was marked. In this new world, EU and bilateral states’ cooperation with the UK has transformed under the combined impacts of the Starmer government and of Trump.

A UK facing constitutional disruption and a major change in its territory is not something most European states would welcome. That does not mean Scotland would be left out in the cold if it voted for independence. But it does mean more sceptical statements on Scottish independence may be faced in a European political context in the run-up to any vote.

Those changed political attitudes will apply not only to membership of any formal security groupings but also to an independent Scotland’s path to the EU. As an independent European state, Scotland will be able to apply to join the EU and would face a normal accession process. But whether, during an independence campaign, we may see a re-run of the doubts on timing that the then European Commission president expressed back in 2014 is an open question.

And how Scotland may fit into the EU’s wider enlargement strategy, at the time of independence, is currently unclear.

Where Ukraine may be politically and in security terms in five years’ time, and whether it will have joined the EU – also whether any western Balkans states will have joined – is unclear as of today. If Ukraine joins the EU by – or hopefully before – 2030, followed not only by western Balkan states and Moldova but perhaps by Iceland too, this may show that the EU’s enlargement path remains straightforward. If these processes stall in the face of geopolitical turbulence, and the US’s siding with Russia, accession might prove harder.

Scotland’s constitutional debate needs to transform in this new and dangerous geopolitical era. The case for independence will have to be made fit for this uncertain and turbulent world. That means prioritising European and wider international networks, and contributing in whatever ways possible to a constructive, democratic European future rather than a weakening of Europe. And it means facing up to the key challenges of transition and the sharp questions transition poses for becoming an independent state at a time of Trumpian world disorder.